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Abstract
What lessons can the study of fundamentalism and the psychology of religion teach the
newer field of Radicalization and Involvement in Violent Extremism (RIVE)? Four lessons
and an intervention are offered in this article: (1) Religion is a robust human experience
and cultural product that adopts a defensive shape when its worldview is threatened. (2)
This does not mean that all "fundamentalisms" or radical versions of religion are somehow
linked or perform similar functions; rather, they reflect the limited human repertoire to
threat, yet within different cultural and historical contexts. (3) Causal explanations on the
level of the individual are insufficient to understand these movements. (4) There is a
modernist trend to elevate word-based, rational knowing over more implicit, symbolic
knowing in both fundamentalism and radical discourses. Fundamentalism and radicalized
religion seem to be the left brain's attempt to"do" religion. And, it does this now even more
separately from the right brain compared to previous eras.1 (5) An intervention addressing
violent extremisms through value complexity draws the above lessons together in an
emergentist model that has an empirical track record of success.
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Introduction
The lessons to be learned for RIVE are an examination of how religion is
being used, by whom, and for what purpose. Complex, interactionist, or
emergentist research models that go beyond binary cause and effect are
more adequate here, but they are less attractive to governments because
they seem to be incapable of prediction and control. However, by the end
of this article, it will become evident that reliable intervention can arise
from an emergentist approach.

Lesson 1) Expect That Sacred Worldviews Will Be
Defended
In the 19th century, the traditional Christian worldview was felt to be
under threat, and Princeton theologians rose to defend the "fundamentals" of the faith. American Protestant fundamentalism, from which all
other fundamentalisms are named, sought to counter the challenge of
Darwinism and higher biblical criticism. The central belief of Protestant
fundamentalism is also its primary defense: the plenary inerrancy of
Scripture. It is the words, not just the ideas, of Scripture that are deemed
inerrant, and thus beyond the dismantling forces of higher criticism, Darwinism, and the liberalization of the modern age. Separatist and quiescent for fifty years after the humiliating Scopes trial in 1925,
fundamentalist movements such as the New Christian Right began to
emerge from 1979 onwards, along with Islamic, Hindu, Jewish, and other
mobilizing religious ideologies.
Recent work in Terror Management Theory helps us to understand how a
shared worldview provides individuals, in their day-to-day experience,
with a defense from inevitable existential anxiety: the fear of death.2 A
large body of research shows that subtle reminders of death increase the
way people defend their cultural worldview.3 Cultural worldviews transcend the individual and provide existential buffering, a sense of meaning, and continuation after death. Given how vital cultural worldviews are
to ward off existential anxiety, if the validity of a cultural worldview is
threatened or damaged in the arena of ideas, this will foment an urgent
search for a solution to reaffirm the worldview. This account maps on well
to the rise of Christian fundamentalism, particularly in its early manifestation, despite the predictions of secularization theorists.4
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The Fundamentalism Project directed by Martin Marty and Scott Appleby
is a multi-disciplinary army of scholars to understand conservative, ideologically-driven religious movements springing up around the world.
Commonalities across the different fundamentalisms were urgently
sought, and some were found:5
• Traditional gender roles ensure a firm family structure
• The rules of religion are deemed as literally binding, leading to a tendency to separatism (for example, a rise in home schooling or faithbased schools)
• A binary cleavage carves the world into the saved in-group versus the
shunned out-group, and
• A yearning for a golden era of religious purity creates a reinterpreted
past, or is cast into an eschatological future, requiring an apocalypse to
trigger the new era6
There is an armored structure to fundamentalisms: they are hierarchical
(in regard to gender and religious leaders), centrally organized (around
an authority belief), clearly demarcated against outsiders, and goal-driven
towards a sacred past or future. What can be said of these varied fundamentalisms is that fundamentalism is not one "thing," but rather it is the
shape that religion takes when it is under threat.7

Lesson 2) Avoid Over-Generalizing
Has the label fundamentalist been properly applied to Muslim contexts?
Here, a different story is told. The failure of the modern nation-state
(either through totalitarianism or a failed Marxist past) and the humiliation of colonial experience entangled with rampant ongoing corruption
created the context for radical discourse to arise. Current economic and
political conditions compare poorly with life in Muslim lands long ago
during the idyllic Golden Age of Islam. The answer: return to a pure Islam
shorn of contemporary ethnic heritages shoe-horned into Westernappointed states. The poetic writings of Qutb and others in the 1960s echoed earlier Salafist writings, and rang true: only Islam can leverage an
overturning of the status quo, unify diverse Muslim populations, and free
them from Western influence. A highly selective and simplified version of
the much-loved religious tradition was deployed. A confluence between
the utopian, radical vision of Qutb was combined with the Wahabi Salafi
version of Islam promoted by Saudi Arabia. Thanks to Saudi petrol dol133
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lars, the marketplace of ideas was flooded with Saudi religious resources
serving the dual purpose of defending its own regime while mobilizing
Western-diaspora alienated youths to jihad.
This movement is not about conserving a religious tradition, as in Christian fundamentalism. The newer term radicalization better describes this
leveraging of change, religious and socio-political—via the selective
Islamist narrative—a story that can give direction and meaning to
oppressed or marginalized lives.
Historian Olivier Roy contends that political Islam has failed in its aim to
achieve a purely Islamic polity.8 What remains of radical Islam has no
practical agenda at all, says Roy.9 As the Taliban demonstrates, radical
piety can lead to violence—a violence that is more symbolic than purposeful. Frustration, utopian thinking, unemployed former mujahideen, and
responses to real and perceived injustice have all combined to allow Al
Qaida to export their jihadi tactics to western converts and western Muslim youths with conflicted identities. The social and cognitive shape these
movements have taken, like fundamentalism, reveals a similar structural
firmness: hierarchical in regards to gender, centrally organized (around
an authoritative narrative and around the extremist group leader), clear
demarcation against outsiders, and goal-driven towards a sacred future.
This does not mean that Islamist radicalization is the same as fundamentalism. The second lesson for RIVE is to beware of over-generalizing from
one religious movement to another.
Rather, the similarities in the social, cognitive shape represent the limited
human repertoire to address threat. This firm social, cognitive shape is
the easiest means by which a movement enables itself to confront insuperable odds. (Other options, such as Ghandi's satyagraha are also possible, but so far, quite exceptional.) The purpose here is radical change, not
the conserving of a current traditional worldview. Architects of radicalization aim to overturn the traditional Muslim worldview, with themselves at
the helm, although this desire for power is masked with Islamic rhetoric.
A different kind of desperation for change in Muslim lands is suggested by
the courage of ordinary people who are fomenting the Arab Spring.

Lesson 3) Simple Explanatory Models Will
Not Suffice
Mono-causal explanations of a "medical model" kind have pervaded
research into both fundamentalism and radicalization: find the cause in
order to eradicate the disease. Given the security risks, governments, who
134
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are key funders of this research, seek categorical answers to solve the
problem of religious violence and terrorism. And clear-cut answers must
be sought, in case they do exist. But fundamentalism and radicalization
have turned out to be flames arising from more complex, shape-shifting
wholes, rather than properties of deviant individuals.
The early study of fundamentalism in the psychology of religion was
marked by a search for what was wrong with fundamentalists as individuals. These studies were mainly carried out on Protestant Christian fundamentalists in the USA, and sought to explain fundamentalism through
individual deficiencies, such as lower levels of moral reasoning, greater
punitiveness, prejudice (in regard to race, gender, political or sexual orientation), authoritarianism, dogmatism, and occurrence of mental health
problems.10 A binary mindset, similar to a fundamentalist mindset, seems
to underpin this research: we are good (tolerant); they are bad (intolerant). Perhaps psychologists, who are among the most non-religious of
academics, were feeling under threat themselves when faced with this
religious upsurge. There was early support for these hypothesized relationships, but research on fundamentalism has been qualified as it has
progressed. The bigger picture now shows that when social class is held
constant, religious items are neutral, and the intrinsic-extrinsic dimensions of religiosity are accounted for, the correlations become negligible.11
In fact, fundamentalists enjoy similar mental health benefits to other religious people: protection from depression, greater optimism, marital happiness, and purpose in life.
There is a trade-off. Fundamentalist discourse does not allow people to
improvise or to develop their religious thinking, and this lack of development can mean the initial helpfulness turns sour. It is important to distinguish between those for whom fundamentalism is currently providing a
"sacred canopy" that is adaptive from those for whom fundamentalism
has become maladaptive. When a fundamentalist feels he or she has outgrown fundamentalism, the process of leaving the fundamentalist "sacred
canopy" is often de-stabilizing. Yao has dealt with people exiting fundamentalism who report extreme guilt and confusion, as well as loss of a valued social group.12 When a person's relationships within the
fundamentalist church break down, that person's entire worldview can be
dismantled. This can contribute to depression, anxiety, and other clinical
disorders. Pargament's research shows how spiritual trauma (trauma
involving religious disappointment) levies high costs in terms of breakdowns, illness, and even death, unless there is sufficient social support on
hand to help people integrate their trauma into new religious understandings and identities.13
135
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Apart from studies of those exiting fundamentalism and some
congregational studies, little attention has been paid to the group level of
analysis. The study of fundamentalism gravitated towards the macrosociological level, or to the level of the individual.14 RIVE has already
learned this lesson, thanks to in-depth interviews with incarcerated
terrorists that focused on the group level of analysis.15, 16 These studies
examine the power of the social group to shape thinking and behavior.
Most studies of radicalization leading to violence show there is a period of
immersion, at some point, in an extremist group. People are rarely
radicalized in a vacuum. A social network links most violent extremists.17
Tightly bounded groups requiring high levels of conformity and
obedience are particularly effective at warding off feelings of uncertainty,
and at presenting a reality that is beyond critique. The extremist,
authoritarian group leader becomes the prototype around which
vulnerable identities can model themselves. Groups reliably tend to
polarize towards the more extreme views within the group.18 Fusion with
the idealized group and separation from former ties can lead to deindividuation and resultant diffusion of moral responsibility.
Dehumanization of the out-group helps to erode the normal barriers to
killing, legitimated by an unquestioned religious discourse.
Leaving extremist groups after intense immersion and sequestering bears
similar costs to leaving fundamentalism: the loss of status within the
group, the loss of belonging to a valued group, the shattering of meaning
and a sacred worldview. People who leave extremist groups do so because
of disillusionment with the totalist group leader, frustration with the low
level of effectiveness in terms of achieving the group's aims, the high cost
of an arduous lifestyle involving separation from family, and the forgoing
of marital or employment prospects. Lessons for de-radicalization include
understanding the way religion and social psychological processes have
become entwined. Prison chaplains need theological understandings that
enable growth beyond the radicalized version to the broader tradition.
They also need to be resourced with social-psychological understandings
of group behavior. This should be a top priority, as belonging to a group in
prison is a necessary means of survival for inmates. Group processes in
prison provide a ready-made vehicle for radicalization. De-radicalization
initiatives in places such as Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Yemen, and Pakistan
have learned that to enable detainees to disengage from violent
extremism, they need to build new social networks, rebuild their family
relationships, and rebuild their capacity to live and work in society. They
need a mixed-method approach that includes job training, religious reeducation, family involvement, psychological counseling, rigorous
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assessment, and ongoing surveillance after release. De-radicalization is
necessarily multi-dimensional: practical, social, cognitive, and
theological.
Individualist approaches marked the effort to find a terrorist profile in
response to 9/11. But this research has foundered, and the lesson has been
learned that individual pathology or demographics will not predict who
turns to violence.19 One of the few recurrent findings is that those who
engage in extremist violence usually have little if any traditional religious
background. It seems that those without a religious background are taken
in more easily by the selective, literalist version of Islam.
Religion does play a role. Scott Atran argues that terrorists are morally
and religiously driven.20 Yet, religion is highly complex, and serves multiple purposes in people's lives, both extrinsically and intrinsically. We
need to disentangle the religious rhetoric of radicalizers from the deeper
levels of religious motivation in people's lives. Youths abducted or lured
into Taliban violence in Swat, Pakistan, or similarly in extremist movements in other parts of the developing world, are mainly motivated by
poverty and the hope for a meal.21 The Taliban's religious narrative is
used to legitimate orders given by commanders. It is important to not
essentialize religion as if it is a singular causal agent.

Lesson 4) Words Rule
What becomes dangerous in either fundamentalism or radicalization
seems to arise from the interaction of modernity with ancient religious
traditions. Shepherd noted that an "engineering," "black and white" mentality exists among Christian fundamentalists.22 Gambetta & Hertog's
research demonstrates that engineers, graduates from a discipline that
proceeds on correct mathematical answers to well-defined problems, are
vastly over-represented among violent extremists.23
While many Christian fundamentalists are anti-evolutionist, they display
a preference for hard facts and proper rational techniques. Barr noted
how Christian fundamentalism stresses the material-physical accuracy of
the Bible, and how it takes its method from a Newtonian model of science.24 Biblical authority will always supersede scientific authority, and if
that entails denying evolution, so be it. But objective truth is preferred,
and this is what the Bible is considered to be. This is achieved through the
fundamentalist belief system being structured around a central authority
belief—the belief in scriptural inerrancy. Inerrancy is deemed sacred and
inviolate, and serves to legitimate all other fundamentalist beliefs in a
137
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one-way direction, with no "back talk" returning to modify the authority
belief.25 Once this admittedly circular premise is accepted, fundamentalist thinking then proceeds logically and systematically.26
In this way, fundamentalists argue for a truth that is considered "objective," an object in the material world—just as science is the pursuit of
"objective truth." To defend the faith, it borrows from science, as if to say:
"If you have a materialist conception of truth with a commitment to rational procedures, so do we." Ironically, Islam, which unlike Christianity,
suffered no historical conflict between science and religion, seems now to
be adopting a similar stance with its own version of creationism promoted
worldwide from its base in Turkey.27 This new Islamic creationism borrows heavily from the "science-like" arguments in contemporary Christian creationism concerning Intelligent Design.28 Islamic tracts handed
out on university campuses typically stress the rationality of Islam, and
radical versions of Islam deploy their most scathing attacks against traditional Muslim symbolic ritual practices. Sufi brotherhoods, once the dominant means of the spread and practice of Islam, are considered "bida"
(reprehensible innovation) by radical Islamists.
There is a modernist trend to elevate word-based, rational knowing over
more implicit, symbolic knowing in both Christian fundamentalism and
radical discourses. Monotheistic religion has always had a doctrinal
(word-based) element, but prior to the Enlightenment, religious knowing
involved a balance between word-based propositions and more symbolic,
implicit forms of knowing that comprised the bedrock of traditional ritual
practice.29, 30 As science has become the main model to which other
sources of knowledge aspire, western and now Islamic societies have been
losing the capacity to read their texts in a metaphorical-symbolic sense.
Instead, they have become preoccupied with the empirical "veracity" of
their content. A dearth of symbolic, implicational processing seems to
make religious knowing more literalistic and inflexible.
A number of dual-process cognitive models make a similar distinction
between "head" (rational word-based) and "heart" (emotional, implicit)
processing. There is now huge empirical support coming from neuroscience for these two different ways of processing information. McGilchrist argues that, among primates, it is only in humans that the right and
left hemispheres of the brain operate quite independently: humans have,
as it were, two brains.31 Further, McGilchrist argues that the two hemispheres are operating more independently now than in previous human
history.
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In most people, the left brain, dealing with language, abstract reasoning,
categorization and focused attention, is the dominant hemisphere. The
left brain is focused on what it already knows and is not interested in what
it does not know. Consistent with cognitive studies that demonstrate that
most humans are "cognitive misers" and will protect existing knowledge
systems against dissonance, the left brain is somewhat closed to new
information.
In contrast, the larger, heavier, more powerful right brain seeks what it
does not know. It is interested in the "other," and is highly connected with
the rest of the nervous system, and thus with bodily states and emotions.
The right brain is interested in faces and individuals; it is the seat of
empathy, moral sense, and self-awareness. The right brain takes the
broad view, considering the wider context, and puts things into perspective. The right brain is crucial to living in the real world (for example,
stroke patients can continue to function with an impaired left brain, but
they can not function at all with an impaired right brain). The right brain
deals with particulars, not abstractions. But the word-based left brain
drives modern culture with all its phenomenal technological achievements, and the right brain is now marginalized in education and culture.
Both right and left brain can do many of the same things. Both hemispheres can "do" religion, but they do religion in a different manner. Fundamentalism and radicalized religion seem to be the left brain's attempt
to "do" religion. And, it does this now even more separately from the right
brain, as compared to previous eras.
Living in an increasingly left-brain, word-based dominated world has
implications for moral values. In a recent study of Catholic Christians,
Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, Corveleyn, and Hutsebaut used Schwartz and
Huisman's cross-culturally validated human values scales to examine
which values participant used in their symbolic approach to their belief
system in comparison with a literal approach to the belief system.32, 33
They found that the symbolic approach highly correlated with the selftranscending, pro-social values of benevolence and universalism (that all
humans are equal in spiritual worth). In contrast, participants taking a
literalist approach to their belief system showed high correlations with
the values of power and security. Overall, there was a near perfect
correlation of 0.95 for this "self-transcendent" versus "self-enhancement"
pattern of values.
Why would there be such a strong correlation between symbolic thinking
and pro-social, altruistic values, while the literal approach correlates
instead with self-protective values of power and security? The study's
139
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post-hoc explanation for this finding is that perspective-taking, the cognitive component of empathy (the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological point of view of others), enables pro-social behavior such as
benevolence.
I now turn to a radicalization prevention program in the UK that
addresses these factors (perspective taking and values) in a group context.
This program shows that when participants achieve higher levels of complexity in values and thinking (the ability to perceive multiple perspectives), the radical binary mindset and approval for violent mobilization
drops away. What emerges for participants is a more integrated British
Muslim identity and a desire for pro-social methods to solve injustice.

5) An Intervention Addressing Violent Extremism
through Value Complexity
Most research now acknowledges that there are multiple roads into radicalization, multiple roads out, and that only a few radicals go on to commit acts of terrorism. Whatever pathway in or out, all radical discourses
have in common a simple binary structure with black and white contrasts:
we are right, they are wrong; we are the in-group, they are the out-group.
This is the place we can intervene for prevention purposes.
Underlying this binary structure is the magnetic pull of one dominant
moral value that has been promoted by the radicalized religious discourse. Extremist ideologies, whether right, left, secular, or religious, tend
towards value monism. They reduce the complexity of the social world in
order to mobilize action to one dominant moral value, in order to maximize the in-group's aims.
In contrast, all mainstream religious traditions are value plural, and thus
more complex. In responding to different challenges over history, mainstream religious traditions, such as Judaism, Christianity, or Islam,
evolve to maximize, within historically imposed limits, the multiple competing values of their constituencies.34 By this we mean that religious traditions take into account the multiple priorities of their communities. For
example, when judging the appropriateness of the use of alcohol for pharmaceutical reasons, Islamic jurisprudence usually rules that alcohol is
allowed to sterilize instruments or skin, even though it is normally proscribed. In this way the precept of prohibiting alcohol is balanced against
the modern benefit of its pharmaceutical use, exemplifying how the
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underlying value of purity (from contamination through contact with
something considered haram, or off limits) is not an absolute when positioned relative to the value of health.35
Fundamentalist and radical groups are much less inclined to work out
value tradeoffs. In an effort to offer simple solutions to a complex world,
those overwhelmed by modernity, including most radical Islamists,
become highly selective within their own traditions, emphasizing certain
texts and interpretations while suppressing others.36 In this process, they
radically alter traditional underlying value hierarchies by increasing some
values' importance while dramatically decreasing that of others. Consequently, these extreme versions of the tradition become less value plural
to the point of absolute value simplification (value monism). This value
monism is what constitutes the "radical" element in extremist Islamic
groups and ideology.37 The example of jihadism is a clear example:
(falsely) promoted as the most important "pillar," it is supposed to supersede the practices of the traditional pillars of Islam. In view of this, we
argue that the appeal of radical groups can be countered by developing
value complexity in line with the mainline tradition of the participants.
In 2010, our research group, the Psychology and Religion Research Group
at the University of Cambridge, developed, and evaluated through preand post-testing, a prevention program in the UK entitled Being Muslim
Being British, designed for young Muslims aged fifteen plus.38, 39
Through eight sessions using DVD films and guided group activities, we
operationalized the raising of complexity in the domain of moral values,
using Suedfeld's concept of integrative complexity (IC). Integrative complexity involves two steps. The first is to be able to differentiate different
perspectives on an issue, to perceive other viewpoints, and to find some
validity in them through perceiving the underlying values for each viewpoint, thus laying the groundwork for perspective-taking. The next step is
to integrate the differentiated viewpoints together in some kind of overarching framework. This could involve, for example, finding trade-offs
between different perspectives or values in tension, being able to identify
shared values between conflicting viewpoints, being able to find win/win
solutions to opposing groups' goals, or finding some context that makes
sense of why reasonable people can maintain opposite views.40
Low integrative complexity (IC) means only one perspective is considered
valid: the world is cast in black or white, groups are good or bad, right or
wrong, seen from one single evaluative viewpoint. Moderate levels of IC
mean that a multiplicity of viewpoints can be considered, and some validity is seen in them, yet without the ability to see any overarching framework. High levels of IC mean that thinkers are able to find integrating
141
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frameworks for differing perspectives.41 In the field of political psychology, the study of integrative complexity enjoys a robust empirical literature in dozens of studies over decades. These studies show that when
political actors' level of integrative complexity drops (measured by coding
speeches, parliamentary proceedings, press releases, letters, and so forth)
from that actor's normal baseline, that sudden drop in the complexity of
the structure of thinking predicts intergroup conflict, violence, and even
military action.42 What causes IC to drop? Research shows it is prolonged
stress and threat to important values, and this in turn predicts intergroup
conflict—just as Christian fundamentalism created a binary discourse to
counter liberalizing forces in order to protect its sacred worldview. What
promotes higher levels of IC is the motivation to maximize a wider array
of one's own important values; and for religious people, this must include
sacred values.43
In short, Being Muslim Being British is a primary prevention initiative
that raises participants' levels of integrative complexity (IC) and increases
the spread of values to include both traditional religious and modernist
secular values as a means of preventing violent extremism and promoting
social cohesion in a globalized context. It is reputedly one of the first prevention programs with empirically measurable outcomes benchmarked
against extremist violence using the non-fakable measure of IC coding,
which codes the less-than-conscious structure of thinking, based on verbalizations arising from activities at the very beginning and at the end of
the course.44 The two hypotheses we advanced and tested were that as a
result of the intervention, participants will think in more complex ways
about social issues underlined by conflicting values, and that participants
will deploy a greater range of values. Research based on eighty-one participants across seven pilot courses around the UK (each course comprising
sixteen contact hours) shows that IC rises significantly in each pilot group
by the end of the course, and that the spread of values increases significantly, in comparison with levels before the course. Our post hoc analysis
results also show that high IC significantly correlates with participants'
choosing pro-social activism rather than violent mobilization. Religious
identity is affirmed and strengthened through the course.45, 46
Both word-based—rational—and symbolic, implicational processing are
needed to scaffold the ability to think more complexly. To operationalize
value complexity in the eight-session course, we help participants to discover some validity in a range of viewpoints (evenly weighted and neutrally labeled) on eight contested topics in radical discourse, using DVD
film. Participants are enabled to achieve differentiation by "laddering
down" to explore the value spectrums that underlie and make sense of the
different viewpoints. This is done verbally and through activity, for exam142
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ple "voting with your feet" to explore the implications of standing at various points along a value spectrum laid out on the floor. This shift from the
concrete level to the abstract level of values enables a cognitive bridge to
new ways of thinking.47
Through carefully structured group activities (debates, dramas, games,
tasks) for each topic, we evoke symbolic, implicational processing
employing action learning through movement, emotions, social interaction, and visual symbols. This embodied, implicational processing supports tolerance of the topic's multi-valence, promoting openness to
perceiving some validity in both seemingly conflicting value poles.48 Participants thus engage in multiple-level processing. This leads towards a
sense of "gestalt" underlying the viewpoints in tension and provides a
bridge to enable rational, word-based integration of viewpoints into their
existing belief systems.49 Through the group activities, we draw on the
body's implicit way of knowing. The mind needs the body for successful
engagement with the world, and body sensations help us to know what is
important to us—what are our own values, and how to understand
another's values.50, 51 Group tasks that use some "everyday" movement
effectively switch off the conceptual mode of mind.52 This helps with precision in thinking and enables people to get beyond bluntly categorizing
into black and white, and to attend with greater specificity to the complexity of the present, indicating greater right-brain activity.53 For example,
when participants in our intervention were asked to verbally describe two
different modes of political decision-making (one democratic, and the
other under a Caliphate), no commonalities or ways of relating the two
could be found; the two means of decision making were seen in terms of
black and white contrasts. But when the participants created non-verbal
mimes (and performed them for "a visiting Martian") to describe both
modes of decision-making, their mimes enabled them to see with greater
detail the areas of commonality shared between democratic and religious
modes of decision-making. Participants were enabled to overcome the
binary black-and-white structure that governed their thinking about the
Caliphate and democracy. Some typical participant responses to the
Being Muslim Being British (BMBB) course are:
"This course has made me proud of myself as a Muslim and proud
of myself to live in this country. And I can say, in an authoritative
way, I can be a Muslim and I can be British as well and contribute
to this society."
– BMBB Participant
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"I realized how strong my actual beliefs and values are in all the
situations we were put through. It's also helped me… to break
away from a kind of tunnel-vision thinking, that everything is
kinda straightforward: all or nothing… I would have just dismissed things very quickly. This course has helped me say, 'Okay,
let me just take a look at that thing and settle my mind a bit.' It
has helped me understand how different people think."
– Participant
"This course has reminded us of the very basic points the Prophet
has taught us: that Islam is the middle way. We shouldn't be
extreme in any way, we should come halfway to understand whoever is opposite to us… We are not the only people to live on this
earth, we have to always find common ground, to come together
with other communities where we live."
– Participant
"The [local] BMBB experience showed that at the beginning the
whole group …aligned with the Hizb ut Tahrir. But at the end of
the course all of them had significantly changed their position."
– Local course facilitator (leader)
For the purposes of prevention, the group activities are designed to recreate the social-psychological processes that shape thinking in extremist
groups. We do this so that the social processes that constrict cognition
(such as group polarization, groupthink, in-group/out-group dynamics)
become "live" in the room.54, 55, 56 By making these processes conscious
through experiencing them, and then talking about them, participants are
free to think for themselves according to their own range of values, and to
avoid a collapse into a binary way of thinking influenced by group processes. Participants' religious commitment remains statistically
unchanged; in fact, it is slightly enhanced. Participants who scored highest on identifying with their (chosen) social group in the post-test condition also showed higher IC.
This intervention will be adapted for use in Pakistan's only deradicalization program for young people under age eighteen in autumn
2011 (at Sabaoon in Swat, Pakistan, directed by Dr. Peracha of the Hum
Pakistani Foundation). A pilot will be run with thirty-five of the most
extreme ex-Taliban youths at Sabaoon, and ongoing assessment will
provide longitudinal data on the impact of the intervention before being
more widely deployed for prevention purposes for Pakistani youth.
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Conclusion
To summarize, developing high integrative complexity thinking in the
domain of moral values can serve as a preventative inoculation against
uncertainty states that can be potentially exploited for violence. At higher
levels of complexity in values and thinking, new possibilities emerge for
participants. The program is not focused upon individual pathology and
trying to correct it. We do not train facilitators to confront maladaptive
thinking, nor do we promote a particular "correct religious understanding." That would risk replacing one binary with another, and the underlying condition would remain: simplified, binary, impoverished cognition
in the religious domain. Our emergentist model posits that at higher levels of complexity in thinking and in the moral domain, powerful changes
occur for participants that enable personal integrity and strongly correlate with eschewing violence and choosing pro-social means of activism to
address grievances.
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